THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD: AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE FUTURE
The roots of the Air National Guard (ANG) and the active component of the Air Force have been inextricably intertwined since shortly after the inception of manned flight. As we move through the historical landscape of WW I, WW II, Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and Operations
Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, however, we see the relationship between these two organizations varying between the chilliness of the 1940s and '50s to the warmth of the 1990s and early '00s.
Several issues in 2005, however, have combined to call into question the future roles and missions of the Air National Guard which has put a chill on that relationship. Given the commonality of mission and purpose between the two, a strong relationship is a must to ensure our Total Air Force air and space forces are presented in a unified, efficient manner.
In looking at this relationship over time and from the Air National Guard's perspective, Guard divisions, a persistent theme began to emerge: the active Army desired an increased aviation capability that conflicted with decreasing postwar military budgets. The solution to these competing demands mixed capability with cost-effectiveness by establishing ten additional non-divisional observation squadrons in the National Guard during the '30s. 4 In the build-up to World War II, the National Guard was ordered into federal service beginning in September of 1940. This resulted in twenty-nine National Guard observation squadrons comprising approximately 4,800 Guard personnel being supplied to the war effort.
Contrary to the Guard's doctrine, however, unit integrity was not maintained as most personnel were eventually parceled out to Army Air Corps units as individuals. 5 This introduced a second long-running theme of the Guard being used in a manner contrary to its expected, organizational employment. It remains a simple backdrop, however, to future political battles that would put the organization on truly firm ground. Americans principally focus on domestic matters. From time to time their attention can be diverted by major threats or by explicit, specific, and dramatic dangers to American lives. But once these troubles vanish from the scene, the public returns to domestic concerns with considerable alacrity. 6 Marshall believed that once the war had been won there would be an overriding domestic desire to "dismantle the nation's military machine" 7 in an effort to reap the domestic rewards of victory.
To plan against this eventuality he recalled Brigadier General (BG) John Palmer from retirement to help develop a postwar military force. With Palmer's help, Marshall decided on a system of universal military training for all able-bodied males. These trainees would "substitute a massive citizen reserve force for a large peacetime professional Army" that would "minimize the financial burdens of national defense." 8 The plan also called for the dissolution of the National Guard as a federal reserve force, primarily due to its divided loyalties and penchant for entanglements in state politics. This general plan was given to the newly-established War Department Special
Planning Division (to which BG Palmer was an advisor) in the summer of 1943 with the charge of fleshing out demobilization and postwar force structure issues.
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At the same time, the Army Air Forces (AAF) established the Post War Division, which was also charged with generating plans for a postwar force structure. Its primary goal, however, was to lay the groundwork for the eventual separation from the Army of an independent Air Force. Although the final plan produced by this group differed greatly from that proposed by the War Department, both eliminated the National Guard from the postwar force structure. This came as the final blow in a long list of slights National Guard personnel felt they had endured.
Other presumed insults included misdirected, bad publicity about the readiness of mobilizing General Staff committee comprised of both Army and Guard leaders was established and charged with studying postwar policy effects on the Guard. Additionally, the National Guard
Bureau regained a more influential position within the War Department. 13 Prospects for a postwar force structure that included a prominent place for the National Guard were becoming much brighter. independent Air Force and, hence, a separate Air National Guard played out against this backdrop of "postwar cost-cutting orgies" that were part of "the wildest, most expensive and reckless demobilization in history." 18 Even so, the basic existence of the Air National Guard was secure. The two primary themes established during this period--the active component's desire
for an increased aviation capability conflicting with decreasing military budgets and the Guard's use in a manner contrary to its expected, organizational employment--would continue. Soon a third theme would emerge to complicate the situation even further.
A Transition to Today's Environment
While still technically considered the primary reserve force, the Air National Guard continued to suffer a second-class existence. This was exhibited by an additional, oft-repeated theme of inadequate training and equipment that plagued the organization and significantly This required first rate equipment and a trained force that could fit seamlessly with the active component personnel." 20 This acceptance by and partnership with the AC led the ANG to give up its "flying club" approach to operations in return for modern equipment and missions. 21 The effectiveness of this development became evident in the 1990s with tighter bonds between the RC and AC produced by three significant events. First, the 1990 Gulf War saw a major call up of ANG forces whose aerial refueling aircraft offloaded in excess of 250 million pounds of fuel to over 18,000 receiving aircraft, whose transports moved 55,000 personnel and 115,000 tons of supplies, and whose fighter units flew 3,645 missions expending 3,500 tons of ordnance. Just as importantly, of the 12,404 Air National Guard members mobilized, over 11,000 were in supporting roles as security police, fire fighters, communications experts, and other technical specialties. as well as limited immigration. Yet government pension plans in these countries are exceptionally generous and existing tax rates are already high. These nations will face the "wrenching dilemma of whether to fund weapons or walkers even more than the United States will" and fervent public support for social programs means cuts will most likely occur in defense, security, and international aid funding. 28 This suggests the U.S. will be even less able to rely on future military and economic support from our key allies to defray costs associated with peacemaking, peacekeeping, and stability operations.
The Air Force responded to these overarching budgetary pressures in two significant ways. First, it began a Future Total Force (FTF) study in 1997 as a means to gain additional fiscal leverage through even greater incorporation of RC assets and manpower into the Total Air Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as a means to realign its basing and aircraft distribution structure. The desired end result was a greater ability to meet current and future needs while eliminating excess capacity as a cost saving measure. 29 In both cases, however, the coordination and implementation of these programs created what BRAC Commission
Chairman Anthony Principi called a "chasm" 30 between the Air Force and the Air Guard which jeopardizes a working relationship that has been increasingly positive over the last fifteen years.
As foundational programs for the future well-being of the Total Air Force, it is important to look at FTF and BRAC in greater detail to better understand the root causes of this divide.
Future Total Force
The Future Total Force policy was generated at the end of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review to begin study on the further integration of reserve and active component forces in an attempt to create a "smaller, more capable and affordable Air Force." 31 Incorporation of the ANG into this new organizational construct was based on three of the Air Guard's historical strengths: cost, experience, and traditional ties to the community. 32 Fiscal comparisons show that stand-alone Air National Guard units are between 25 and 40 percent less expensive than their Active Duty counterparts 33 for several reasons, including its part-time work force structure, minimal facility requirements, and matching state funds. 34 The FTF program looked to further increase these cost savings through the incorporation of unique basing plans that would bring As the FTF plan began to emerge, though, it was broadly condemned by many in the ANG for multiple reasons. First, the near-term end-state of this reorganization would be a twenty-five percent reduction in fighter aircraft as part of a ten percent reduction in the total number of aircraft in the Air Force. This cutback is the result of increased capabilities in newer airframes combined with a need to divest the force of less capable, aging platforms that require substantial maintenance investments. As legacy aircraft are retired, the preponderance of the effect of this cutback would fall on the ANG given its proportional strength in fighter aviation and the composite age of its fleet. I'm worried, if we move all the planes away from some of these bases, it's going to be literally impossible to recruit new folks for that empty unit without an aircraft. And we'll also lose a lot of our most experienced, most valuable, and in some cases combat-hardened personnel, who are simply unable to move to the new enclave location, due to the fact that they'd lose their jobs, their civilian employment. Through creation of innovative organizational and basing solutions, the Air Force will facilitate joint and multi-component missions, reduce inefficiencies, and free up valuable resources to recruit quality people, modernize equipment and infrastructure, and develop the capabilities needed to meet 21st Century threats. 49 The BRAC process was hotly contested by many governors, members of Congress, and state adjutants general who felt they had been left out of the process. As opposed to Army officials who worked directly with the state adjutants general (TAGs) in generating BRAC recommendations for Army National Guard units, the Air Force kept the individual states at arms length for reasons that will be discussed later. Guard Bureau to fully coordinate with 54 TAGs. As Major General Lemke stated, "I think that three-way communication is always going to be just difficult because of the timeliness of it and the fact that it's not the way people within the Department of Defense are used to operating." 57 In dealing with the initial BRAC commission recommendations, the ANG employed many of the same tools previously used from 1944 to 1946 to secure the National Guard's future.
The National Guard Association was once again called upon to lobby for the interests of the ANG, although the Adjutants General Association was much more publicly active in both the press and testimony before congress. Given the direct impact of the loss of military capability within several states--particularly in a post-9/11 world where homeland defense was of particular concern--pressure from affected members of Congress and governors was particularly strong.
In response, the Adjutants General Association created five guiding principles that provided a foundation for much of the follow-on BRAC and Future Total Force debate. Those principles were:
• Retain militia basing concept (dispersed in communities)
• Work with the Air Force to build upon the cost efficiencies, capabilities, and community support by assuring the continued effectiveness of existing flying units and accompanying force structure with Air Expeditionary Force capabilities
• Each state is assigned a baseline homeland defense force that at a minimum includes civil engineering, medical, and security forces
• The ANG maintains essential and proportional shares of flying missions in fighters, tankers, and airlift
• The AF collaborates with the ANG and states through AGA on new and emerging missions 58 These principles directly led to a compromise plan drafted by the AGA and Major General
Lempke that included at its core the fundamental idea of maintaining one flying unit per state. 59 This plan was soon adopted by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Blum, and became NGB policy shortly thereafter. 60 The BRAC Commission, after significant debate, accepted this idea by passing a recommendation that ensured every state with an existing Air Guard unit would retain a flying mission. shifted the country's political focus away from BRAC and towards recovery efforts after these devastating storms.
Many of these issues remain unresolved and the rift between the active and reserve components generated by them continues to grow. This is a trend that must be reversed so all components of the Air Force can focus on their primary mission of defending the United States and protecting its interests through air and space power. In working out these issues, it is critical for all parties to recognize that, as stated in the official description of the Future Total Force program, the AF is "better and more resilient because of the intra-service competitions, debates and points of view. The proof is found in the product, the force it fields around the globe today. Each component has made immense contributions and will continue to do so." 62 Although frustrating, this debate is valuable as long as it leads to specific solutions that result in better capabilities at reasonable costs. Today's post-9/11 environment is volatile, uncertain, ambiguous, and complex. The potential for smaller scale yet increasingly frequent conflicts has already driven the Air Force towards the requirement for a more agile, flexible, and cost-effective force structure. The ANG is a critical component of that structure, yet intraservice frictions caused by today's environment threaten its foundations. Three recommendations follow that may help reduce these frictions and ultimately lead to a force even more capable of effectively operating in current and future environments.
Recommendations
First, although intra-service competitions can be valuable, they must be based on a solid understanding at multiple levels of each organization's missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures. To foster this understanding, more ANG officer and senior noncommissioned officer positions should be made available on all service and joint headquarters staffs. 63 Increased interactions between ANG and active component personnel would help reduce misunderstandings over the core issues noted above. For this to be effective, though, the Air National Guard would need to ensure that only top-notch, highlyqualified personnel were assigned to these positions. Upon completion of such tours, accommodations would also need to be made for these members back in their states so these assignments would be considered beneficial, career-broadening experiences. All too often similar, current assignments become a mechanism for personnel to simply gain rank or for traditional guardsmen to remain employed during lulls in their civilian employment. what will be a long war." 64 As stated by Maj Gen Lempke, though, "[a]t some point the militia must return to being citizens first." 65 Although recruiting and retention in the ANG has not been an issue to date, the good will towards military service generated by 9/11 will eventually wear thin and both employers and employees will find it increasingly difficult to support the significant time commitments currently associated with ANG service.
This reality can be balanced in one of two ways : either full-time manning in the ANG must be increased or current and new missions must be distributed with this concern in mind.
Increasing "Unfortunately, at the state level the Air National Guard has fairly consistently resisted taking on the missions that the joint force really needs them to do. So now the Guard is complaining about reorganization efforts that would force them to change the way they do business." 66 The major BRAC and FTF rift revolves around keeping substantial portions of the flying mission, and particularly fighters, in the ANG. Expending political capital to keep legacy fighter aircraft in the guard may lead to the maintenance of both hardware and personnel authorizations, but this will only be temporary.
As one quarter of the fighter force is retired over the next ten years, it is also understood that new fighter aircraft will not replace these legacy systems on a one for one basis. Additionally, such missions directly tie into the Guard's Homeland Security and Defense responsibilities, creating an even greater synergy through the combination of wartime missions, homeland security taskings, and available civilian experience. Aggressively pursuing missions that effectively meld these three areas into a working whole may result in smaller organizations and a possible loss of force structure, but it will secure a long-term position for the ANG in missions that are equally or even more relevant to the Total Force and state governors.
Care must be taken in this pursuit, though. Full integration into the Air Expeditionary
Force rotation cycle and availability of a highly-skilled manpower pool for state disaster and contingency response have turned the ANG into the pride of many state and federal politicians.
As in the post-WWII environment, the Air National Guard can call upon this reserve of good will as it pursues future missions. Organizations like the National Guard Association and the Adjutants General Association can also use that state mandate to wield substantial power at the national level. In dealing with the active component over contentious future mission issues, though, that power should only be used as a last resort and in a manner that seeks viable, longterm solutions to the future missions debate. Any other use will only widen the rift between the components. Placing ANG officers and senior enlisted members on headquarters staffs, working for missions appropriate to the Citizen/Airman construct, and specifically taking a longterm, pragmatic approach to flying missions will certainly help. This must occur, though, in an environment of mutual respect and understanding to ensure the nation strikes an appropriate balance between broad-based air and space capabilities and cost effectiveness.
Conclusion
Political and economic weight ultimately led to the establishment of the Air National Guard as an independent reserve force. Those same forces have solidified a role for the ANG in current and future missions as economic realities combined with the unique abilities of the ANG to directly function in the Homeland Security arena. The partnership between the active Air Force and the Air National Guard is based on common missions, capabilities, and an overarching goal of protecting and defending the United States and its global interests.
Cooperative engagement is a must to ensure that the current rift caused by FTF and BRAC implementation does not degenerate into an internecine feud that jeopardizes our collective ability to reach that goal.
As Henry Ford II said, "No society of nations, no people within a nation, no family can benefit through mutual aid unless good will exceeds ill will; unless the spirit of cooperation surpasses antagonism; unless we all see and act as though the other man's welfare determines our own welfare." 71 This quotation is equally relevant to the relationship between the ANG and the active Air Force--two organizations with inextricably linked interests and welfare. Only mutual understanding and a willingness to make tough decisions will ensure that link is strong and able to meet the goal articulated by the Chief of the Future Total Force program office which is "a future where we no longer have to say, 'Total Force'. We are the United States Air Force, and that says it all." 72 Endnotes 2 The modern formulation of the National Guard took place from 1881 to 1892 when the states revised their military codes in recognition of the need to provide for an organized military force with greater capabilities than the traditional militia. Most states also changed the name of their militias to their "National Guard." These state initiatives were recognized by the federal government in 1903 with the enactment of the Dick Act which affirmed the National Guard as the Army's primary organized reserve force. The National Defense Act Amendments of 1920 further solidified the importance of the Guard by placing National Guard officers on the general staff and at division headquarters. The National Guard Mobilization Act of 1933 brought the National Guard fully into the fold by making it a component of the Army at all times and giving the President the ability to order the Guard onto active duty with a congressional declaration of war. http://www.arng.army.mil/history/; Internet; accessed 4 November 2005.
